We examine the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Using an exploratory factor analysis we identify four dimensions of political instability: (1) mass civil protest, (2) politically motivated aggression, (3) instability within the political regime and (4) instability of the political regime. We show that individual political instability indicators are generally poor proxies for the underlying dimensions of political instability. Our panel estimates for a sample of 98 countries in the period [1984][1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003] indicate that the various dimensions of political instability have different effects on economic growth.
Introduction
Ever since the early studies by Venieris and Gupta (1986) and Gupta (1990) , economists have tried to understand the relationship between political instability and economic outcomes. Drazen (2000) provides two reasons why political instability may affect economic outcomes. Firstly, political instability creates uncertainty with respect to future institutions and policymakers, which alters the behavior of private agents and firms with respect to the accumulation of capital. In addition, it changes the incentives of policymakers who either try to increase their term in office or take benefit of the position they have while they are in office.
1 Secondly, political instability can have a direct effect on productivity, because it disrupts market functioning and economic relations.
Since political instability in a country cannot be measured directly, empirical studies often rely on indicators like the number of coups d'état (Londregan and Poole, 1990) or proxies such as the number of political assassinations and political revolutions (Barro, 1991) . While these indicators probably capture some aspects of political instability, they are certainly not perfect. Some authors acknowledge the problem of measurement error and combine various indicators in a single index using discriminant analysis (Gupta, 1990; Venieris and Gupta, 1986) or principal components analysis (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Annett, 2001) . Others predict the propensity of government change using binary choice models in which the occurrence of (irregular) government transfers is related to various economic, political and institutional variables (e.g. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992; Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel, 1996; Chen and Feng, 1996; Svensson, 1998) .
These approaches have in common that the used indicators are assumed to be highly correlated with political instability and that political instability is a one-dimensional concept. The first assumption is generally validated on theoretical grounds, but it is never thoroughly tested. The assumption that political instability has only one dimension has been disputed by a number of studies in political science using the principal components method to identify different dimensions of political instability. Although these studies primarily focus on the dimensionality of political violence (which is a rather narrow definition of political instability, see Carmignani (2003) ), none of these studies finds that political instability is one-dimensional. Instead, the results vary substantially ranging from two (Hibbs, 1973) to nine dimensions (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966) . 2 More recent work in economics (e.g. Chauvet, 2002 or Campos and Nugent, 2002) acknowledges that political instability is multidimensional and identifies various dimensions of political instability on a priori grounds. These dimensions, in turn, are
represented by a selected group of indicators. This approach obviously entails the risk of a confirmation bias when determining the dimensionality of political instability.
This paper has three objectives. The first aim is to examine the dimensionality of political instability in a more substantive way than in previous studies. We employ 26 widely used indicators of political instability in an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). In contrast to principal components analysis (PCA), which is a data reduction technique to explain as much variance of the indicators as possible, factor analysis models the covariance of a group of indicators in such a way that the common variation in the variables is explained We find that political instability has four dimensions: mass civil protest, politically motivated aggression, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime. Furthermore, we find that individual indicators are generally poor reflections of the underlying latent variable. Finally, we show that the four political instability dimensions that we identify have different effects on economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the factor analysis model. Our dataset is discussed in section 3. Section 4 provides the results of the factor analysis. We examine the differences between the dimensions of political 2 Other studies that also address the dimensionality of political instability using principal components analysis include Rummel (1963) , Tanter (1966) , Rummel (1966) , Bwy (1968) who all find three dimensions, Morrison and Stevenson (1971) find four dimensions. Sanders (1981) criticizes the cited studies and provides a theoretical framework of the dimensionality of political instability. He concludes that political instability has four dimensions.
instability in more detail in section 5. In section 6, we use our newly constructed indexes to examine whether the different dimensions of political instability are related to economic growth. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Methodology
The literature concerning political instability has employed many different variables to reflect the unobserved concept of political instability. While every single indicator probably reflects some information about political instability, none of them is perfect. In other words: political instability indicators contain measurement error. To solve the measurement problem, researchers have frequently calculated one dimensional indexes using discriminant analysis (Gupta, 1990; Venieris and Gupta, 1986) or principal components analysis (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Annett, 2001) . Others have tried to predict the propensity of government change using binary choice models in which the occurrence of government transfers is related to various economic, political and institutional variables (e.g. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992; Chen and Feng, 1996) . A shortcoming of the studies that combine indicators into a single index, is the assumption that political instability is a one dimensional concept. This would not be too problematic if all (relevant) sub dimensions would behave similarly and would affect the economy in a similar fashion. However, this is unlikely on theoretical grounds. Svensson (1998) , for instance, argues that political instability is negatively related to capital accumulation (and hence economic growth) since it creates uncertainty with respect to the security of property rights. However, Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000) argue that the possibility of government change, or unstable leadership, creates competition over policy ideas, which will lead to better government policies and will foster economic growth.
In order to examine the multidimensional character of political instability we employ factor analysis. Although this method is akin to principal components analysis, the subtle difference is that the latter is a data reduction method to extract as much of the variance contained in a set of indicators, while factor analysis is based on a model and extracts only the information common to all indicators. We will briefly discuss the factor analysis model.
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As said, the aim of the factor analysis model is to separate the information that is common to all indicators from the information that is unique to a single indicator. By assuming that the observed indicators are "generated" by a linear combination of unobserved factors and some individual error term, a simple model structure is imposed on the covariance matrix of the indicators. When a convenient and parsimonious model is specified, the factor analysis can be used to obtain unbiased predictions of the values of the unobserved latent variables.
The factor analysis model with multiple factors can be written as follows:
where y denotes the observed (demeaned) indicator for observation n, B is the matrix of factor loadings, ξ is a vector of latent variables and ε is a random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the latent variables as well as uncorrelated with each other. Under these assumptions, the covariance matrix of the model is:
where Σ is the parameterized covariance matrix, Φ is the covariance matrix of the factors
and Ω is the (diagonal) covariance matrix of the error terms. The first term on the righthand side of equation (2) reflects the variance explained by the linear combination of the factors and the second term reflects the variance unique to the individual indicator. The latter shows how much measurement error an indicator contains. 4 We estimate the factor loadings and the unique variances with the method of Maximum
Likelihood. Under the normality assumption, we write the likelihood function:
where S is the sample covariance matrix of the indicators.
Having optimized the likelihood function, it is possible that the factors of the (standardized) solution of the model are difficult to interpret. In that case, we can make use of the fact that the distribution of the indicators depends on the factor loadings B, only through BΦB' and hence the matrix of factor loadings is not identified. That is, it can be multiplied with any orthonormal matrix without affecting the distribution of the indicators. In other words: the factor loadings matrix is open to rotation, yielding a solution that may be easier to interpret because the matrix has a simpler structure. Ideally, each indicator is correlated with as few factors as possible. The rotation technique that we use to interpret the factors is the Oblimin rotation, which allows for correlation among the factors and minimizes the correlation of the columns of the factor loadings matrix. As a result, a typical indicator will have high factor loadings on one factor, while it has low loadings on the other factors.
When the model is correctly estimated and interpreted, it is possible to obtain values for the underlying factors, i.e. the separate dimensions of political instability. These values of the dimensions of political instability can be used to evaluate the correlation with individual indicators, but can also be used in empirical applications to obtain more reliable estimates of the role of political instability in economics. Although various approaches exist, we advocate the so-called Bartlett predictor (Bartlett, 1937) :
The Bartlett predictor is found to be the best linear unbiased predictor of the factor scores (see e.g. Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000) .
Data
In order to construct a dataset for the factor analysis model on political instability, we have to take a number of decisions with respect to which indicators to include, which sources to use and which period to consider. In principle, we aim to use as many indicators as possible that proxy for political instability. The indicators are mainly selected on the basis of the surveys by Brunetti (1997) , Aron (2000) and Carmignani (2003) . The indicators we use for our analysis are from the following commonly used sources: The Banks Cross National Time Series Archive (Banks, 2005) , The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Polity IV dataset, the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (Gleditsch et. al, 2002) and the Database of Political Institutions of the World Bank (Beck et al., 2001) . In case an indicator (e.g. election data and cabinet changes) is contained in more than one source, we used the source with the maximum number of observations. 6 One exception is the variable Years of ruling party in office of the DPI for which no indicator was available based on frequencies.
valid proxies only when they are averaged over a longer time period. For that reason, we calculated 10-year averages of the indicators.
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A problem we encountered for some indicators is missing data. Not all indicators are available for all countries in all years. Therefore, we only included some indicator in our sample if at least 5 observations were available in a given time period. Unfortunately, still some missing observations remain. If we would leave out those countries for which we do not have data for all indicators our dataset would decrease by twenty-three percent (59 out of 254 country observations). Since only one percent (95 out of 6604 indicator observations) of all observations is missing, samplewise deletion would imply that valuable information contained in the available indicators would be lost. In order to use as much information as possible and to obtain factor scores for those observations with missing data, we applied the EM algorithm of Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) to impute the missing observations. 
Results
To extract the appropriate number of factors in the exploratory factor analysis, we consider a number of commonly used "rules" and fit-statistics. We start with examining Cattell's screeplot (Cattell, 1966) which plots the number of factors against the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the indicators. 7 We also did the same analysis with 5-year averages as well as 20-year averages. It turns out that using longer and shorter time spans does not alter the results reported in the next section. 8 A different approach we also considered is to impute the missing observations with the mean of the relevant indicator. It turns out that the correlation coefficient of the identified factors with data imputation with the identified factors with imputed means is always greater 0.98. We also examined the case when covariances are calculated pairwise and factor scores were only calculated for those cases for which all indicators were available. The correlation coefficients between this solution (without imputation) with our preferred approach are all greater than 0.99. Not surprisingly, all results we obtain in the remainder of the paper are qualitatively unaffected when the other two approaches are followed. 9 This is confirmed by a Likelihood ratio test, which compares the factor model with four factors with a saturated factor model. The test-statistic is 829.53 which is χ 2 (227) distributed and is highly significant at the one percent significance level.
Moreover, the solution with four factors renders the smallest value for Akaike's Information Criterion as well as the Schwartz Criterion for all admissible models. From this, we conclude that a model with four factors is appropriate.
9 A different rule is the Kaiser criterion, which states that all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 should be included in the model. As the screeplot indicates, there are 6 factors with eigenvalue greater than 1. However, the solutions with five factors or more are so-called Heywood cases. These are solutions in which some of the unique variances of the indicators are estimated smaller than zero. In general a Heywood case (Heywood, 1931) is an indication of a poorly specified model (see e.g Marcoulides and Hershberger, 1997) .
The results of the rotated factor solution can be found in table 1, which shows the matrix of factor loadings (also known as the pattern matrix). Since the Oblimin rotation minimizes the correlation between columns of the factor loadings matrix, the general pattern that arises is that every indicator has a high loading on one factor, while it has low loadings on the other factors. The indicators with high factor loadings can be used to interpret the factors. The first factor has high loadings for the indicators associated with political violence and warfare. Therefore, we call this factor "politically motivated aggression" and abbreviate it as: Aggression. Indicators that are associated with collective protest by the population are clearly the only variables that have high loadings for the second factor. In turn, we label this factor as mass civil protest.
The third factor is labeled "within regime instability" (and henceforth called: Within), because it corresponds to indicators reflecting changes within the political system such as the changes in the chief executive and replacements of veto players in the political process. The indicators with high loadings on the fourth factor are the number of major constitutional changes, the number of coups d'état and the number of regime changes (both indicators). These events obviously reflect instability of the political regime, which we dub as Regime from now on. Table 1 The so-called factor structure matrix reveals that the indicators guerilla and 
Differences between the dimensions of Political Instability: patterns within and between countries
This section examines the differences between the dimensions of political instability for which we have obtained factor score predictions in the previous section. A second issue that is interesting to examine is how individual countries score on the different dimensions of political instability. 
The impact of political instability on economic growth
In the previous sections we argued that political instability is a multidimensional concept and that individual political instability indicators contain measurement error.
Furthermore, some descriptive statistics revealed that the dimensions of political instability manifest themselves differently in individual countries. As we differentiate between the separate dimensions of political instability and our newly distilled indexes suffer less from measurement error, it is worthwhile to examine whether these dimensions also affect macroeconomic outcomes differently.
A widely studied topic in which (one dimensional) measures of political instability are used as explanatory variables is (long run) economic growth. 13 To examine the effect that the different dimensions of political instability have on long term growth, we use an augmented version of the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995) 14 who derive the specification of their empirical model from the Solow (1956) model. As the model is used to examine the differences between the dimensions of political instability, we do not intensively examine the robustness of our results nor do we address the possibility of joint endogeneity of political instability and economic growth.
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The model we estimate is as follows:
where growth it represents the average economic growth per capita for country i in period t (1984-1993 and 1994-2003, respectively) . Z it is a vector with explanatory variables used by Mankiw et al. (1992) . The vector includes the real gross-domestic product per capita (in 2000 US$) of country i at the beginning of period t, Investment, i.e., the average gross 13 Examples include Gupta (1990) , Londregan and Poole (1990) , Barro (1991) , Levine and Renelt (1992) , , Perotti (1996) , Ades and Chua (1997) , Easterly and Levine (1997) , Sala-i-Martin (1997) Chen and Feng (1997) , Easterly (2001) , Alesina et al. (2003) Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) and Sturm and de Haan (2005) 14 The only difference between our model and the model of Mankiw et al. (1992) is that we use a fixed effects panel model with 2 time periods (1984-1993 and 1994-2003) , while they use a cross-section model for the period 1960-1989. The main difference between our model and that of Islam (1995) is that we consider 10-year averages instead of 5-year averages to proxy for long-term economic growth. 15 See De Haan and Sturm (2005) for a further discussion on robustness issues. See or Perotti (1996) , for instance, on the simultaneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Since our dataset contains two periods, we allow for country specific effects in the regressions (indicated by µ i in the model specification). This reduces potential endogeneity problems to the extent that the identified dimensions of political instability are correlated with country-specific (time invariant) characteristics. An F-test examining the hypothesis that all country specific effects equal zero is soundly rejected at the 5 percent significance level for all specifications. Moreover, Hausman tests (Hausman, 1978) comparing the estimates of a fixed effects model with the estimates of a random effects model all reject the null-hypothesis that the set of estimates do not differ systematically. On the basis of both tests, we conclude that the model specification should include country specific effects. Furthermore, the specification of the model is also not rejected by the more general Ramsey RESET test of specification error (Ramsey, 1969) . Finally, we also checked whether the disturbance term is heteroscedastic. The
White test (White, 1980) could not reject the null-hypothesis of homoscedastic disturbances for all specifications.
Our estimation results are shown in table 4.
16 The Barro-Lee dataset on schooling contains only data for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. To approximate begin of period schooling we use the values of 1980 and 1990. We also estimated the models with the values of 1985 and 1995, but this did not alter any of the results. 17 We also estimated the models using the real GDP per capita indicator of the IMF world economic outlook. The reported results remain unchanged when using the alternative dependent variable. The first column shows the results of the baseline specification of Mankiw et al. (1992) .
The variables of the baseline model all have the expected sign, but are not all statistically significant. Although our model controls for country specific effects, the estimates confirm the findings of Mankiw et al. (1992) that initial GDP levels and the (human) capital stock are significantly related to real GDP growth per capita, while population growth is not a determinant of real GDP growth per capita. In the second and third column, we show the model estimates when two frequently used variables (i.e. the sum of revolutions and coups and the number of political assassinations) are used as proxies for political instability.
18 Since the models are estimated in natural logarithms we can interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities. It can be seen that the estimated elasticities of these proxies for political instability are both -0.01 and are not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the increase of the (within) R-squared of these models relative to the baseline specification is very small. On the basis of these indicators two conclusions could be drawn. Either political instability is unrelated to economic growth, Within dimension has a moderate positive impact on economic growth, but is also statistically insignificant. At first sight, the positive coefficient might be surprising.
However, as illustrated in the previous section, this dimension also reflects the presence of democracy (or lack thereof) and there is some recent evidence suggesting that democracy has a positive impact on economic growth (see, e.g. Plümper and Martin, 2003) . The Protest dimension is significantly different from zero and has an elasticity of -0.01. In other words: the estimate indicates that a one-hundred percent increase in civil protest decreases the growth rate with one percent. Moreover, the part of the variance in per capita real GDP growth that is explained by the model markedly increases when the Protest variable is added to the model. Finally, the Regime dimension has a negative impact on economic growth and is also significant at the five percent significance level.
The estimate indicates that a hundred percent increase in regime instability decreases the growth rate with two percent. Again, the (within) R-squared is substantially higher than in the baseline specification as well as the specification in which only the sum of coups 18 Examples are mentioned in footnote 12.
and variables are used to proxy for political instability. 19 The last column shows the estimates when all dimensions of political instability are included in the model. The results of this encompassing model do not differ from the other findings. However, the latter specification allows us to test the linear hypothesis that all political instability dimensions are equal. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level. 20 From this we conclude that the different dimensions of political instability have different effects on economic growth.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we examined the dimensionality of political instability using an exploratory factor analysis. In contrast to earlier studies we find that political instability has four dimensions. These dimensions are: civil protest, politically motivated aggression, instability within the political regime, and instability of the political regime. Secondly, simple correlation coefficients illustrate that individual indicators generally are poor reflections of the underlying latent dimension of political instability. Moreover, political instability indicators used in previous studies often do not reflect the concept the researchers have in mind when they examine the effect of political instability on economic outcomes. Finally, we examined to which extent the dimensions of political instability are different. Using a model similar to Mankiw et al (1992) we show that the four political instability dimensions have different effects on long run economic growth.
We find that only instability of the political regime and civil protest are significantly related to long run economic growth and that a hundred percent increase of these dimensions is associated with a lower real per capita growth rate of two percent and one percent, respectively. Furthermore, the model including our indices for political instability explains a substantially larger part of the variance of the growth rate than an 19 In order to examine parameter constancy we estimated the same models with regional (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East\North Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, East Asia and OECD), income (low, lower-middle, upper middle and high income countries according to World Bank definitions) and polity (democratic, partly democratic and non democratic) specific coefficients for all political instability variables. When testing the linear restriction that all regional (or income or polity) coefficients are equal, we find that there is no parameter heterogeneity with respect to income level and the political system for any of the political instability variables. However, we do find that the effect of within instability on economic growth is significantly different in OECD (23 countries) and in Eastern European countries (4 countries). For these countries the estimated elasticity is -0.03 and 0.13, respectively. 20 The test statistic is 2.75 and F(3,78) distributed. The p-value is 0.048.
often used proxy for political instability being the sum of political revolutions and coups.
We want to emphasize here that the economic implications of our results still have to be taken with care. An important issue which is not addressed in this paper, for example, is the possibility of reverse causality between economic growth and political instability. In addition, issues that receive increasing interest in the growth literature such as the importance of influential observations and model uncertainty are not dealt with. These issues obviously provide opportunities for further research. Nevertheless, our results strongly indicate that considering political instability as a one dimensional phenomenon may lead to misleading results in empirical applications.
Appendix A. List of variables, definitions and sources

Indicator definition Source
Assassinations Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician Banks (2005) Cabinet changes The number of times in a year that a new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers.
Banks (2005) Civil war dummy variable, 1 if at least 1000 battle related deaths per year in a conflict between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without foreign intervention and 0 otherwise. Gleditsch et al. (2002) Coups d'etat The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure in a given year.
Banks (2005) Major government crises
Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow Banks (2005) Demonstrations Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly antiforeign nature
Banks (2005) Ethnic tensions An assessment of the degree of tensions within a country which is attributable to racial, nationality or language divisions
ICRG Executive changes
The number of times in a year that effective control of the executive Dower changes hands.
Banks (2005) Fractionalization The probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties.
Beck et al. (2001) Government stability
An assessment of the governments ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office
ICRG
Guerilla warfare
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.
Banks (2005)
Internal conflicts an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance
ICRG
Major constitutional changes
The number of basic alterations in a state's constitutional structure, the extreme case being the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alters the prerogatives of the various branches of government.
Banks (2005) Medium civil conflicts Dummy variable, 1 if there are more than 25 battle related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1000 battle related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year (between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without foreign intervention) and 0 otherwise Gleditsch et al. (2002) Minor civil conflicts Dummy variable, 1 if there are at least 25 battle related deaths per year for every year in the period in a conflict between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, without foreign intervention and 0 otherwise Gleditsch et al. (2002) Number of elections
The number of elections held for the lower house of a national legislature in a given year.
Banks (2005) Polarization Maximum polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature. 
Strikes Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.
Banks ( 
